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Abstract 
 
The political left turn in Latin America, which lagged its transition to liberalized 
market economies by a decade or more, challenges conventional economic 
explanations of voting behavior. While the implications of upward mobility for the 
political preferences of forward-looking voters have been studied, neither the 
upward mobility model nor conventional myopic median voter models are well 
equipped to explain Latin America’s political transformation. This paper generalizes 
the forward-looking voter model to consider a broad range of dynamic processes. 
When voters have full information on the nature of income dynamics in a transition 
economy, we show that strong support for redistributive policies will materialize 
rapidly if income dynamics offer few prospects of upward mobility for key sections 
of the electorate. In contrast, when voters have imperfect information, our model 
predicts a slow and politically polarizing shift toward redistributive voter 
preferences under these same non-concave income dynamics. Simulation using 
fitted income dynamics for two Latin American economies suggests that the 
imperfect information model better accounts for the observed shift back to the left in 
Latin America, and that this generalized, forward-looking voter approach may offer 
additional insights about political dynamics in other transition economies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Most Latin American countries had transitioned to market economies by the early 1990’s.
The largely center right political leadership that instituted these transitions continued to
win national elections and persisted in power throughout the 1990s and into the early
2000’s. Since that time, electoral politics have turned sharply left. The recent suite of
presidential elections have seen left-leaning candidates defeat more conservative opponents
in Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and
Venezuela.1 Not only have these elections ushered in a political shift, they have in many
instances been hotly contested by candidates offering fundamentally different economic
visions. The goal of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework to help us understand
the economic forces that underlie these complex political dynamics.
The influential body of political economy literature that focuses on economic inequality
as a force that determines both political institutions and voting patterns would seem to
offer a window into these political patterns [Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, Boix, 2003].
However, the fact that inequality measures tend to be remarkably stable over time makes
it unlikely that inequality can explain the right-left voting dynamics of Latin America.
A recent paper by Robert Kaufman [2009] confirms the inconvenient empirical fact that
existing measures of economic inequality do a very poor job of explaining both political
institutions and voting patterns in Latin America.
Although we could abandon the search for economic explanations of contemporary vot-
ing patterns and appeal to other factors to explain them, we instead take our cue from the
Benabou and Ok [2001] model of voters as forward-looking agents, who have full informa-
tion about their economy’s income distribution dynamics, and who formulate their political
preferences based on how redistribution will influence their future income streams. From
this perspective, voters should be driven by income dynamics, not by the current level of
income inequality or other features of the contemporaneous income distribution.2
1While the contemporary Latin American left cannot be defined by a shared economic model, this new left
does share a largely populist impulse and desire to shift resources and opportunity to those at the bottom of
the income distribution. For instance, Greene and Baker [2009] construct vote revealed leftism (VRL) from
ideological ratings of presidents and parliamentary parties in Latin America from 1996-2008, showing that
the left has an economic policy mandate to halt or partially reverse neoliberal economic policies.
2Fields [2007] makes this point even more strongly by showing how inequality can increase during the early
stages of a period of upward mobility that would surely dampen political preferences for redistribution.
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Benabou and Ok specifically show that concave income distribution dynamics that offer
the prospect of upward mobility (or, POUM) can account for anti-redistribution conser-
vatism.3 Under POUM, forward-looking voters who would benefit from redistribution in
the short run do not benefit in the long run and therefore vote against long term redis-
tributive policies. A first contribution of this paper is to generalize the class of income
transition functions considered by these authors. We show that non-concave income tran-
sition functions of the sort suggested by poverty trap theory, which offer no prospect of
upward mobility (or, No-POUM), can result in a surprisingly and increasingly redistribu-
tive electorate.4 Our result shows that redistributive dynamics are determined by smoothed
envelopes drawn around income transition functions. This result generalizes the connection
between redistribution and income beyond the usual concepts of concavity and convexity.
In an effort to corroborate this theoretical intuition, we calibrate a simple class of in-
come dynamics to Latin American countries. These estimates indeed reveal the sort of
No-POUM dynamics that would be expected to generate an increasingly pro-redistribution
electorate. Surprisingly, applying these dynamics to our full information, forward-looking
voting model indicates that the demand for redistribution should have been stronger and
should have occurred well in advance of the recent suite of Latin American presidential
elections. This result presents a puzzle that questions fundamental assumptions about how
economic voters process and react to economic prospects. A second contribution of this
paper is to explore this puzzle within a rational voter framework.
We argue it is the assumption that voters have full information about their economy’s
income distribution dynamics that is most problematic, especially in transition economies
where the electorate had little prior experience of a liberalized market economy (e.g. Prze-
worski, 1991). In such circumstances, voters have little choice but to fall back on priors
about how such an economy might work.5 In Latin America, the shift to the liberal eco-
nomic model was put forward on the grounds that it would boost incomes and well being
3Complementary endogenous explanations for anti-redistributive positions include disincentives for labor
supply as typified by Meltzer and Richards [1981], asset formation [Persson and Tabellini, 1994], inefficient
levels of public goods [Alesina and Rodrik, 1994], multidimensional policy spaces in which non-economic
preferences conflict with pocketbook voting [Roemer, 2001]. To highlight the roles of income dynamics and
learning, we ignore the incentive effects of taxation, but do account for the role of deadweight loss.
4Indeed, Tucker [2006] shows that voting in the post Soviet bloc reflects economic experiences: areas with
poor economic outcomes tend to support “Old Regime” parties while good outcomes provide support for
liberal “New Regime” parties.
5Our approach to modeling ideology as an idiosyncratic evolving process echos Bates et al. [1998] as a means
to complement cultural and ideological political theories with rational choice. The Latin American case is
also compounded by a recent history of autocracy which likely bounded the range of publicly admissible
ideologies, a possibility easily modeled in our framework.
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for all, including the lower half of the income distribution.6 Assuming that voters begin
with this “POUM prior,” we go on to model voters as Bayesian learners who experientially
update their expectations based on their own stochastic income experience. Leveraging
the POUM and No-POUM distinction, we characterize “Left” vs “Right” Bayesian beliefs
about income dynamics. We show that this model of forward-looking, Bayesian voters of-
fers an empirically tenable explanation of the recent right to left political evolution in Latin
America. A key ingredient in this explanation is that dead weight loss induces political
volatility in uncertain environments, a new effect that the voter learning approach reveals.
While increased dead weight loss reduces support for redistribution for both right and left
voters, the effect is stronger for right voters and further polarizes the electorate.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a basic frame-
work for individual and aggregate income dynamics in the presence of transient shocks,
and models political support for redistributive policies by both myopic and forward-looking
voters who enjoy full information about the income dynamic process. Section 3 then intro-
duces both concave (POUM) and poverty trap (No-POUM) dynamics, and derives results
on the political preferences of fully-informed, forward-looking voters. The analysis of Sec-
tion 3 is applied to Latin American income dynamics in Section 4. Section 5 then relaxes
the full information assumption, and explores political dynamics when voters learn about
the true income distribution dynamics that characterize their economy. Section 6 shows
this model of forward-looking Bayesian voters who confront a No-POUM world can give
rise to the political polarization and sudden political shifts that have been observed in 21st
century Latin America. Section 7 concludes.
2. FORWARD-LOOKING VOTERS AND THE DEMAND FOR REDISTRIBUTION
This section lays out machinery needed to discuss changing patterns in majoritarian vot-
ing when the electorate can choose among income redistribution schemes. Our emphasis
is the role of income dynamics, rather than static measures of inequality (e.g. Moene and
Wallerstein [2001]). The setting is a continuum of voters whose incomes evolve over time
and fluctuate with idiosyncratic shocks each period. Voters care only about maximizing
the present discounted value of income from all sources, whether public or private, and are
thus “pocketbook voters.” We consider the fraction of the voter population who rationally
prefer income redistribution, which we term the demand for redistribution.
6See for example Williamson 1990 [Williamson, John, 1990, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform,”
in Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? edited by J.Williamson (Washington: Insti-
tute for International Economics)] for a classic statement of the so-called Washington Consensus about the
desirability of liberal economic policies for Latin America.
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In order to evaluate a particular redistributive policy, each voter considers three things:
their individual income path, the aggregate income path of the economy and the longevity
of the policy. Changes in the economy over time thereby induce changes in voting patterns,
and support for a given policy is dependent on expected economic conditions. To help
unpack these relationships, this section defines income transitions, redistributive schemes
and forward-looking demand for redistribution.
2.1. Stochastic Income Transitions. Individuals are indexed by i and have an initial in-
come yi0. The initial income distribution F0 is assumed to be bounded and absolutely
continuous. After the initial period 0, individual i’s income at time t is
yit = E [yit |E [yit−1]] · εit(2.1)
where εit is iid across individuals and periods with E [εit ] = 1. These assumptions imply
that the expected income path for any individual is deterministic. To see this, note that since
E [εit ] = 1, Equation (2.1) implies E [yit ] = E [yit |E [yit−1]]. Thus if expected income in pe-
riod t−1, E [yit−1], is known then E [yit ] is known. Certainly each individual’s initial income
yi0 is known, which fixes E [yi1] = E [yi1|E [yi0]]. This in turn fixes E [yi2] = E [yi2|E [yi1]] and
so on. Let f denote the function that maps expected income in period t−1 to expected in-
come in period t, formally
f ≡ E [yit ] = f (E [yit−1]) . (Expected Income Transition)(2.2)
For brevity, we will refer to f as an income transition function. Recursing Equation (2.2)
back to an individual’s initial income yi0 also shows
E [yit ] = f (E [yit−1]) = f ( f (E [yit−2])) = f (2) (E [yit−2])
and proceeding in this fashion, expected income in period t for a voter with initial income
yi0 is E [yit ] = f (t)(yi0), while realized income is given by yit = f (t)(yi0) · εit .
When making decisions about the future, we assume voters care only about present dis-
counted income, discounted at rate δ each period. We can therefore write each voter’s
discounted income stream over T periods as:
T
∑
t=0
δ tyit =
T
∑
t=0
δ t f (t)(yi0) · εit . (Discounted Income Stream)(2.3)
Since E [εit ] = 1, expected present discounted income can be read off Equation (2.3) as
E
[
∑Tt=0 δ tyit
]
= ∑Tt=0 δ t f (t)(yi0). We now turn to policies which might redistribute this
income.
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2.2. Myopic Demand for Redistribution. Consider the political preferences of myopic,
pocketbook voters whose incomes evolve according to a known income transition function
f as above. Pocketbook voters choose policies which maximize their income, and for
simplicity we assume voters are risk neutral. Following Benabou and Ok [2001], we define
redistribution schemes composed of a flat tax τ and a lump sum transfer to all voters. Such
redistribution schemes are denoted rτ where if rτ is enacted in period t, each voter i receives
income rτ(yit):
rτ(yit)≡ (1− τ) · yit + τ · (1−D)µt(2.4)
Here µt denotes the mean income of the population at time t and D ∈ [0,1] denotes any
dead weight loss under the redistributive scheme. A myopic voter’s most preferred policy
τ∗ must maximize expected income E [rτ(yit)]. Since
E [rτ(yit)] = (1− τ) ·E [yit ]+ τ · (1−D)E [µt ]
= (1− τ) · f (t)(yi0)+ τ · (1−D)µt
either τ∗ = 1 (complete redistribution) or τ∗ = 0 (laissez-faire).7
Now consider a majoritarian vote taken between τ = 1 and τ = 0 at the beginning of
period t before idiosyncratic shocks are realized. A myopic voter i prefers τ = 1 to τ = 0
exactly when E[yit ] = f (t)(yi0)≤ (1−D)µt , which means they expect to be below average
income, less any deadweight loss. Since f in increasing, all voters with initial incomes
yi0 ≤ f (−t) ((1−D)µt) prefer τ = 1 to τ = 0. The fraction of such voters in the population
is determined by the initial distribution of income F0 to arrive at
Pr(Voter prefers τ = 1)= F0
(
f (−t) ((1−D)µt)
)
(Myopic Demand for Redistribution).
2.3. Forward-looking Demand for Redistribution. We now follow Benabou and Ok’s
framework of forward-looking voters who consider redistributive policies that last from
period 0 through period T . Over this time frame, define a voter’s discounted income stream
under laissez-faire (τ = 0) as gT (yi0). From Equation (2.3), gT (yi0) = ∑Tt=0 δ t f (t)(yi0) and
the average of all voters’ discounted income streams is therefore µT ≡∑Tt=0 δ tµt . Complete
redistribution (τ = 1) over this period would pay out µT , less any deadweight loss, giving
a discounted income of (1−D)µT . Consequently, a voter prefers τ = 1 to τ = 0 from
periods 0 through T if and only if gT (yi0) ≤ (1−D)µT . Akin to the myopic case, the
7This has the implication that if f is known perfectly, voters with the same initial income yi0 vote identically.
In contrast, the vote could be modeled as taking place after the realization of the shocks εit , so vote tallies
will have an element of randomness which depends on the distribution of εit .
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proportion of voters demanding redistribution is
Pr(Voter prefers τ = 1)= F0
([
gT
]−1 (
(1−D)µT)) (Forward Demand for Redistribution).
This equation shows that the fraction of the population who wants redistribution takes
into account discounting and the evolution of income during the policy. The term[
gT
]−1 (
(1−D)µT) is the forward-looking generalization of the term f (−t)((1−D)µt)
that determines the demand for redistribution in the myopic voter case. Note that a voter
who looks forward only one period (or who considers a policy that will last only one year)
has the same preferences as a myopic voter. While initial income distribution, F0, appears
to play a similar role in setting both the myopic and forward-looking demands for redis-
tribution, we shall see later that small perturbations in F0 can give rise to large changes in
forward-looking demand for redistribution, especially for large T . The critical factor is the
shape of the underlying income transition function, f . The next section develops a method
to explore voter dynamics under any continuous income transition function, a family that
is broad enough to encapsulate the processes implied by theories of both convergent and
divergent income distribution dynamics.
3. POLITICAL EVOLUTION UNDER FULL INFORMATION
The Solow model of neoclassical economic growth relies on an assumption of dimin-
ishing capital returns and implies that poorer nations will tend to catch up over time, or
converge, with the incomes of richer nations.8 When transported to the individual or mi-
croeconomic level, the Solow assumptions imply a process of convergence among the pop-
ulation of a single country.
Figure 1(a) illustrates a typical income dynamic implied by accumulation under decreas-
ing returns. Note that this concave transition process, maps incomes in period t into in-
comes in period t + 1, implies a unique long term or steady state income level, y∗, at the
point where fp(y) crosses the 45-degree line. Under this transition process, individuals
who begin with incomes below the steady state level will converge towards it, while those
who begin above the steady state level will drop back towards it. Note that this sort of
concave income process offers prospects of upward mobility (POUM) to voters whose ini-
tial income levels are less than the steady state income level. This Prospect of Upward
Mobility for the poor to achieve convergence with the population at large can serve to
lessen preferences for redistribution. This mechanism allows Benabou and Ok [2001] to
connect POUM income dynamics and aversion to redistribution. Subsequent evidence for
8For an early review of both the theoretical and empirical controversies, see Romer [1994]. A more recent
review with a theoretical emphasis is Azariadis and Stachurski [2005].
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FIGURE 1. POUM and No-POUM Income Transitions
(A) POUM Income Dynamics (B) No-POUM Income Dynamics
the income-based approach to voting has been mixed, and its reach can be extended by
modeling more general income dynamics.9
In contrast to Figure 1(a), individuals need not face uniformly decreasing returns in
asset accumulation. The increasingly well developed theory of poverty traps suggests a
number of mechanisms that can trap households at low living standards (see the review in
Carter and Barrett [2006]). Central to all of these theories of poverty traps is exclusion
from financial markets.10 Put differently, if households have access to loan markets and
insurance instruments, then even when confronted by locally increasing returns to scale
and risk, they can successfully engineer a strategy to obtain the assets needed to jump to a
high level equilibrium. But absent access to those financial markets, households below a
critical initial asset level may remain stuck in a low level, poverty trap equilibrium.
9Fong [2001] finds that variables reflecting personal benefit from redistribution are insignificant in predicting
redistributive preferences in the US. On the other hand, Checchi and Filippin [2004] find some experimental
support that the POUM reduces chosen taxation rates and that longer time horizons tend to decrease cho-
sen rates under POUM. Beckman and Zheng [2003] find tentative support for the POUM hypothesis using
undergraduate surveys (primarily business and economics majors). At the international level, Wong [2002]
examines the GSS and World Values Survey for redistributive preferences and finds the expected signs across
incomes, but no evidence of the “tipping behavior” implied by median voter or POUM models. Wong also
finds that expected income indicators can help explain redistributive preferences, but are small in magnitude.
10There is now a plethora of theory about why financial markets are often thin, missing and, or biased against
low wealth agents. Banerjee and Newman [1994] provide an example of a debt based poverty trap which
generates income dynamics. For a recent contribution, see Boucher et al. [2007].
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The result of such poverty trap models is Figure 1(b) which illustrates income transition
dynamics with multiple steady states.11 The non-concave income transition function, fn(y),
has multiple crossings of the 45-degree line and admits multiple equilibria: y∗H is the high
income steady state; y∗L is the low level steady state. Bifurcation occurs around the unstable
equilibrium income level, yb. Households with incomes in excess of yb will tend toward
the high level equilibrium while those that begin below this critical threshold will head
towards the low level, poverty trap equilibrium, y∗L. This implies no prospect of upward
mobility (No-POUM) for voters below the threshold yb. In contrast to an economy with
a concave income transition function, economic polarization will occur and inequality can
deepen when income transitions are governed by a non-concave function like fn(y).12
The remainder of this section considers any continuous income transition function, al-
lowing for both fp and fn types of income transitions and then derives a general set of
results with political implications. We show that relaxing Benabou and Ok’s assumption
of concavity can generate rich pattens in the demand for redistribution. We then provide a
theorem showing how these new income transitions create both increases and decreases in
the demand for redistribution, even when the transition function is neither globally concave
nor convex.
3.1. Demand for Redistribution. As shown in Section 2, when voters are myopic, the
fraction of the population who demand redistribution at time t is given by F0( f (−t)((1−D)µt)).
Whether this fraction increases or decreases over time depends on f (−t)((1−D)µt). In a
POUM world, the global concavity of f implies (through Jensen’s inequality) the relation-
ship f (−t)((1−D)µt)≥ f (−(t+1))((1−D)µt+1) so the demand for redistribution is always
decreasing over time.
Similarly, if voters are forward-looking, the fraction of the population that wants re-
distribution F0(
[
gT
]−1
((1−D)µT )) monotonically decreases as the duration of a policy
increases.13 Therefore in a POUM world with forward-looking voters, the demand for re-
distribution decreases with time in two senses: as evaluations each single period and as
policy longevity increases. This is the type of behavior that Benabou and Ok set out to
explain. These two salient aspects of redistributive dynamics in a POUM world can be
summarized as
11For empirical examples see Lybbert et al. [2004] and Adato et al. [2006]. Banerjee and Newman [2000]
construct a macroeconomic model of “dynamic institutional change” which implies non-concave income
dynamics and exhibits path dependence on the distribution of wealth.
12Strictly speaking, this non-concave income transition function implies increasing polarization, not neces-
sarily increasing inequality, as Esteban and Ray [1994] discuss.
13These statements follow respectively from Proposition 2 and Theorem 3 of Benabou and Ok [2001].
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Proposition (POUM Dynamics). Suppose f is concave. Then:
(1) The demand for a single period of redistribution decreases over time.
(2) The demand for redistribution over a T period horizon decreases in T .
FIGURE 2. Upper and Lower Envelopes
(A) POUM World (B) No-POUM World
While voter dynamics under POUM are relatively straightforward, non-convexities un-
der general income transitions lead to more complex redistributive dynamics. To better
describe this complex process, we connect the changing demand for redistribution to the
upper and lower envelopes of an income dynamic. We first define the upper envelope of
f , f , as the envelope created by tracing all lines which are above, but do not cross f . The
lower envelope f is defined similarly. Both types of envelopes are illustrated in Figure 2(b)
and defined in Equation (3.1).
f ≡ inf{h(x) : h is a line, h≥ f}, f ≡ sup{h(x) : h is a line, f ≥ h}.(3.1)
Clearly for each y we have f (y)≥ f (y)≥ f (y) and necessarily f is concave and f is convex.
Two special cases stand out. When f is concave, f and f coincide. When f is convex, f
and f coincide. Therefore in a POUM world, f = f . We define the sets of incomes where f
and f exactly coincide as YP (as this is the domain of upward mobility). Similarly define the
domain of downward mobility, YN, as incomes where f and f coincide. The relationship
of YP and YN to the path of redistributive preferences is given in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. If µt ∈ YP then the demand for redistribution decreases in period t relative
to period t−1. Conversely, if µt ∈ YN then the demand for redistribution increases.
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Proof. We consider µt ∈ YP as the other case is similar. We want to show that f (−t)(µt)≥
f (−(t+1))(µt+1). This holds iff µt+1 ≤ f (µt) and by assumption f (µt) = f (µt). There-
fore we are done if we can show µt+1 =
∫
f (t+1)dF0 ≤ f (µt). Since f ≤ f we know that∫
f (t+1)dF0 ≤
∫
f ◦ f (t)dF0 so we need to show
∫
f ◦ f (t)dF0 ≤ f (µt). In fact, this last
inequality holds by Jensen’s inequality since by construction, f is concave. 
Proposition 1 says that if the mean income next period µt lies in YP, the demand for re-
distribution decreases. Conversely, if µt lies in YN, the demand for redistribution increases.
In this sense, the upper and lower envelopes of f are natural definitions of Right and Left
income transitions based on f . This also highlights the differences between POUM and
No-POUM income dynamics. In a POUM world, f is concave and equals f so all incomes
(including µt) are in YP. Therefore the demand for redistribution is always decreasing
(Figure 2a). In contrast, a No-POUM income dynamic has both YP and YN regions. De-
pending on where µt lies the next period, the demand for redistribution can either increase
or decrease (Figure 2b).
In a No-POUM world, the determination of whether the demand for redistribution is in-
creasing or decreasing depends simultaneously on the current period, the expected income
transition and the initial distribution of income. Although the demand for redistribution
may be directly computed, in general it is hard to derive a particular path analytically due
to its dependence on the range of possible income distributions. In the appendix, we il-
lustrate this point with a concrete example where small changes in F0 cause qualitative
changes in the demand for redistribution over time. The appendix also shows that for a
large class of income dynamics, whether the demand for redistribution is increasing or de-
creasing depends heavily on the initial distribution of income. In the next section we apply
these insights about curvature to actual income dynamics in Latin America.
4. DEMAND FOR REDISTRIBUTION IN LATIN AMERICA
The prior section has shown that political dynamics for forward looking voters will de-
pend on both the income transition and the initial distribution of income. This section
asks if these two considerations can help us understand recent electoral dynamics in Latin
America. Building on the method of Shorrocks and Wan [2008], we first recover income
distributions for several periods, and then use these to calibrate income transition functions
as the basis for the analysis of political dynamics in Chile and Peru.
4.1. Income Distribution Dynamics in Chile and Peru. The analysis here relies on in-
come decile data from SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank, 2011). We first use
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this data to to construct approximate income distributions
{
Fˆt
}
for each period by fitting
a monotone spline to recover each distribution.14 In order to recover income dynamics
fˆ (y), we consider all functions which are composed of line segments spanning each in-
come decile. Letting β denote a vector of ten line slopes (one for each decile), we can
write every admissible income dynamic fˆ (y) as fβ (y) for some β . To calibrate fβ (y), we
make use of the identity that if Ft(y) is the distribution of expected incomes E [yit ], then
f (t)(y) =F−1t ◦F0(y)(4.1)
which fixes the relationship between the annual distribution of income Ft(y) and the true
income dynamic f (y).15 Equation (4.1) combined with estimates of the income distribution
each period, say
{
Fˆt
}
, provides a basis to calibrate fβ (y) since Equation (4.1) implies
f (t)β (y)≈ Fˆ−1t ◦ Fˆ0(y) for each observed period t.16
Using these relationships, we then fit fβ (y) to best explain the recovered income distribu-
tions for each observed year,
{
Fˆt
}
. To do this, we assume Fˆ−1t ◦ Fˆ0(y) = f (t)β (y) · ε(y) with
the error term ε(y) distributed lognormal(0,σ). This implies that for each y, Fˆ−1t ◦ Fˆ0(y) is
distributed lognormal
(
f (t)β (y),σ
)
. Taking our cue from maximum likelihood estimation,
let φ(y,µ,σ) denote the lognormal likelihood for an observation y. We then maximize the
log likelihood summed across all years and incomes by finding β and σ to solve Equation
(4.2):
max
β ,σ
∑
t observed
∫
lnφ
(
y, f (t)β (y),σ
)
dF0(y).(4.2)
Further numerical details are given in the appendix below.
Having calibrated fβ (y) to recover income dynamics fˆ (y) for Chile and Peru, we present
the results graphically in Figure 3. A benchmark of ten years is illustrated as this roughly
corresponds to two presidential election cycles in Latin American countries. Thus Figure 3
shows the calibrated income dynamic over ten years ( fˆ (10)) for each country. The vertical
lines lines in the graphs represent rough boundaries between income decile ranges As can
14The SEDLAC income measures include monetary, non-monetary and transfer income in addition to im-
puted rent, and we use the following country-year pairs: Chile (1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2006) and
Peru (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006).
15To see this identity, note that by definition, Ft(y) = Pr(yit ≤ y) and since yit = f (t)(yi0) we have
Ft(y) = Pr(yit ≤ y) = Pr
(
f (t)(yi0)≤ y
)
= Pr
(
yi0 ≤ f (−t)(y)
)
= F0
(
f (−t)(y)
)
.
It follows that F−10 ◦Ft(y) = f (−t)(y) and finally by inverting both sides that f (t)(y) = F−1t ◦F0(y).
16This is similar to Shorrocks and Wan [2008] who use a parametric approach to back out income distribu-
tions from income decile data. By comparing synthetic income distributions generated by their method with
known distributions, these authors find this method to have surprising accuracy.
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be seen, the income dynamics for Peru show areas of convexity for much of the income
distribution and therefore exhibit No-POUM dynamics. In contrast, the income dynamics
for Chile show at least some prospects for absolute, if not relative, mobility for all deciles
of the income distribution.
FIGURE 3. Calibrated Income Transition Functions
(A) Chile 10-year Transition (B) Peru 10-year Transition
4.2. Predicted Political Dynamics Under Full Information. Using the recovered in-
come transition functions for Peru and Chile, we now derive the electoral dynamics implied
by our model of voters who possess full information on the underlying income transition
process. We consider the historical time period covered by our income decile data (mid-
1990s to the mid-2000s) and consider policy longevities (degrees of forward-lookingness)
of 1 to 10 years. We assume that redistribution incurs no dead weight loss (D = 0) and
voters have a discount rate of δ = .95. Computing the demand for redistribution across
time and for varying policy lengths then follows the development above. At any point in
historical time, H, and for any degree of policy longevity, T , we calculate the fraction of
the electorate supporting different policies as implied by our model:
Pr(Voter prefers τ = 1)= F˜H
([
gˆT
]−1 (µˆT)) (Forward Demand for Redistribution)
where gˆT (yi0)≡ ∑Tt=0 δ t fˆ (t)(yi0), µˆT ≡ E
[
gˆT (yi0)
]
and F˜H (y)≡ Fˆ0 ◦ fˆ (−H) (y).
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Figure 4 graphs the results of these calculations for Chile and Peru under the assumptions
that redistribution incurs no dead weight loss (D = 0) and that δ = .95. First, consider
the myopic (T = 1) demand for redistribution in each country. Over time, Chile shows
a fairly linear pattern in Figure 3(a), which implies fairly flat redistributive preferences
over the period as calculated in Figure 4(a). In contrast, reflecting the non-concavities
in its estimated income dynamics, Peru shows a pattern in which the myopic demand for
redistribution increases over time.
Figure 4 also allows us to see what happens over time when voters are forward-looking
(and as policy longevity increases). In the case of Chile, more forward-looking voters
and longer-lasting policies barely perturbs the demand for redistribution at any point in
time. Peru again presents an interesting picture as more forward-looking voters support
redistribution more strongly than do myopic voters, increasingly so over historical time.
FIGURE 4. Evolving Demand for Redistribution
(A) % Demanding Redistribution: Chile (B) % Demanding Redistribution: Peru
While the contrast between Chile and Peru illustrates the importance of income transi-
tion dynamics for political dynamics, the calculated level of support for redistribution is
remarkable high for both countries, in all time periods and under any degree of forward-
lookingness. Put differently, the full information voter model predicts that there would have
been strong support for redistributive policies long before such support actually emerged.
While there are many possible explanations for the tardy arrival of support for more aggres-
sively redistributive policies, one is that voters perceived significant dead weight losses to
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redistribution. To explore this idea, we calculate the level of dead weight taxation loss that
would have been necessary to provide majoritarian support for non-redistributive, laissez
faire policies in Chile and Peru under the assumptions used to generate Figure 4. These
levels are 45-48% in Chile and 43-47% in Peru. These levels are exceedingly high in com-
parison to existing estimates of dead weight loss (See for instance Olken [2006]), making
it unlikely that dead weight losses explain the mismatch between model prediction and
reality.
5. LEARNING AND VOTING UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION
While the analysis so far is consistent with the left turn that took place in Latin America
politics, it cannot account for the timing of that shift, throwing into sharp relief the ques-
tion as to why so many voted for largely laissez faire policies prior to the early part of this
century. The answer cannot be found in the prospect of upward mobility as our recovered
income transitions suggest that there were not prospects of upward mobility for important
segments of the electorate. Indeed, forward-looking pocketbook voters with perfect in-
formation on the nature of income dynamics would have supported redistributive policies
sooner and more forcefully than they actually did.17
In reality of course, perfect information is unlikely as income dynamics and the prospects
for mobility are complex and hard to understand, especially in transition economies, which
had fundamentally altered their economic model. Our analysis so far has followed Benabou
and Ok and assumed that voters know the true income transition function and use this
knowledge to construct their forward looking income forecasts and vote accordingly. We
now relax this assumption and consider the behavior of voters who must learn about the the
true income dynamics from their own experience.
To keep this problem manageable, we assume voters face a known family of possible
expected income transition functions fλ (y) indexed by the parameter λ . The family of
expected income transitions is assumed to be bracketed by two extreme specifications, one
representing a right perspective or vision of how the economy operates (λ = 1) and the
other a left perspective (λ = 0). We refer to these specifications as “ideologies,” using this
word to denote a model or understanding of how the world works. We assume that any
income transition function that voters consider can be expressed as a linear combination of
17It is of course possible that people are fooled, or fool themselves, about the nature of income dynamics
and vote against their true economic interests. Survey research which assesses voter’s subjective expecta-
tions about prospects has found “POUM captures hopes and expectations as well as realistic socioeconomic
assessments” [Graham and Pettinato, 2002]. Additional possibilities are considered by Putterman [1996]. A
careful study of how economic information is mediated by larger sets of social relations is Herrera [2005] in
the context of post-USSR Russia.
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the left ( fL) and the right ( fR) ideologies:
fλ (y) = (1−λ ) fL(y)+λ fR(y)(5.1)
At any point in time t, the individual’s understanding of the economy can be represented
by a probability density piit(λ ) over possible values of λ while the true value of λ , labeled
λ0, is unknown to voters. Note that this specification naturally describes someone with a left
view of the world as putting a lot of probability weight on low or left values of λ , whereas
a right view of the world would have probability weight near the right side of the spectrum
or 1. We normalize the true value of state of the world λ0 to be 1/2. This specification of
how voters predict their future income under incomplete information will be incorporated
into our model of forward-looking voters.18 However, we first consider how the critical
new element, the voter’s probability distribution piit(λ ), is formed and evolves over time.
Each voter i begins with a prior distribution pii0(λ ) over possible values of λ . We also as-
sume that voters keep track of their idiosyncratic income histories Hit ≡ {yi0, . . . ,yit}. The
history Hit is used to update beliefs each period to a posterior belief piit(λ |Hit) according to
Bayes rule. In our context, we can think of pii0(λ ) as the initial ideological beliefs a voter
has about the income transitions they face, while piit(λ |Hit) are the voter’s new ideological
beliefs after t periods of learning the true income dynamic.
In order to make this learning process concrete, we now analyze it assuming an explicit
structure of the transient income shocks and their relationship to income each period in
Assumption 1.
Assumption 1. The income dynamic each voter faces satisfies the following:
(1) The true state of the world is normalized to λ0 = 1/2.
(2) The shock εit is distributed Uniform(1−σ ,1+σ) for some σ ∈ (0,1).
(3) Voters know the value of σ .
Under Assumption 1, yit = f
(t)
1/2(yi0) · εit so voters receive some random fraction, εit ,
of their true expected income given λ0 = 1/2. The magnitude of σ determines whether
fluctuations around the expected value are large or small, with a larger σ obscuring the true
income dynamic from voters.
18Note that this specification could be extended to incorporate the possibility that repression or fear constricts
the political space, leading people to vote, say, more conservatively than they otherwise might. For instance,
voters may fear possible retribution for revealing their ideological “type” because of potential political polic-
ing (e.g. a potential return to dictatorship in early 1990’s Chile). In this case, one could model the ideological
space as being constrained in an ideological spectrum of [λ t ,λ t ] which expands with “political thawing” and
voter faith in democratic institutions over time. The gradual expansion of publicly admissible views may also
help explain large shifts.
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Now consider how voters update their beliefs under Assumption 1. Since for any true
state of the world λ , εit = yit/ f
(t)
λ (yi0) and each voter knows that |εit−1| ≤ σ , voters know∣∣∣yit// f (t)λ (yi0)−1∣∣∣≤ σ .(5.2)
Equation (5.2) encapsulates the fact that a voter knows that realized income yit must be
within a fraction σ of expected income f (t)λ (yi0). Therefore any state λ for which Equation
(5.2) fails to hold cannot correspond to the true income dynamic. Eliminating these impos-
sible states is exactly what Bayes rule dictates as the updating rule. Accordingly, piit(λ |Hit)
is exactly pii0(λ ) restricted to all values of λ that satisfy Equation (5.2) for the voter’s entire
history Hit , then normalized to integrate to one.19
Appendix C develops the mechanics of the learning dynamics in more detail. These
assumptions (and associated analytics) imply that voting behavior under imperfect infor-
mation is determined by each voter’s beliefs given their income history (piit(λ |Hit)) and the
expected redistributive transfer for each possible state of the world λ . A myopic pocket-
book voter (looking forward only one period) will vote in favor of redistribution in period
t when the voter believes expected transfers are positive:∫ 1
0
[
(1−D)
∫
f (t+1)λ (y)dF0(y)− f
(t+1)
λ (yi0)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Transfer|λ ,yi0
·
[
piit(λ |Hit)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Beliefs|Hit
dλ ≥ 0.
This expression naturally generalizes to the case when policies persist and voters look
forward by more than one period. As this expression makes clear, evolving voter beliefs
inserts another dynamic element into the determination of political preferences. The next
section will explore whether the forward-looking voter model, augmented with Bayesian
learning effects, can better explain contemporary Latin American political dynamics.
6. THE RIGHT LEFT POLITICAL SHIFT IN IN LATIN AMERICA
This section employs the model of forward-looking, Bayesian voters to analyze the right
to left political shift observed across contemporary Latin America. To do this, we first pro-
vide an empirically grounded approach for representing left and right political ideologies.
Second, we argue that economic crises of the 1980s put the left in disarray, and at the time
of the market transitions voters adopted a POUM prior as the economic crises of the 1980s
left no credible alternative to the emergent neoliberal model. Applying these assumptions
19The assumption that εit ∼ Uniform guarantees a clean updating rule which reduces the computational
burden for applications. Other shock distributions are similar in character but will induce updating rules that
include weights from εit for each voter history that substantially increase computational dimensionality.
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to Peru, we show that voter learning over the course of a dozen years would be expected to
generate up to a 27 percentage point shift in the electorate towards preferring redistributive
to free market policies, with those preferring redistribution moving from a minority to a
majority of the population.
6.1. Empirical Approximation of Left and Right Ideologies. In order to arrive at plau-
sible left and right ideological models of income dynamics, we construct two functions ( fR
and fL) that surround and exaggerate the true empirical income transition function, fˆ (y).
We begin by characterizing the right income transition model as one that offers greater
prospects for upward mobility and implies less demand for redistribution than does fˆ . For
a given fR, we then residually construct fL so that the true function can be expressed as a
linear combination of the left and right ideologies as specified in Equation (5.1) above.
We keep our modeling options fairly open by defining fR using a continuum of transition
functions fρ(y) indexed by the parameter ρ . Successively higher values of ρ correspond
to more exaggerated right ideologies that promise greater upward mobility and imply less
demand for redistribution. Given our method for residually calculating the left ideology,
higher values of ρ also imply greater ideological polarization in the sense that the left
and right positions become more sharply differentiated. Our characterization of any such
continuum of fρ(y) relies on the following partial converse of Jensen’s Inequality, proved
in the appendix.
Lemma. Suppose f and g are continuous where g is defined on f ((−∞,∞)). Then g is
concave iff g(E [ f (X)])≥ E [g( f (X))] for all bounded random variables X.
This result shows in particular that if g is continuous and g(E [X ]) ≥ E [g(X)] for all
bounded random variables X , then g is concave. The Lemma helps provide a sharp char-
acterization about which members of a family of income transitions are more ideologically
“Right” in that they induce lower demand for redistribution, as given in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Let fρ(y) be a set of income transitions indexed by ρ . Assume each fρ(y)
is strictly increasing and twice continuously differentiable. Then demand for redistribution
decreases in ρ for all income distributions if and only if ∂∂y ln
∂
∂y fρ(y) decreases in ρ .
Proof. We want to show that for all ∆> 0
f−1ρ
(∫
fρdF
)
≥ f−1ρ+∆
(∫
fρ+∆dF
)
(6.1)
for all bounded distributions F , iff ∂∂x ln
∂
∂x fρ(x) decreases in ρ . Let h be defined by
h ≡ fρ+∆ ◦ f−1ρ , and since fρ+∆ is strictly increasing, Equation (6.1) is equivalent to
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h
(∫
fρdF
) ≥ ∫ h ◦ fρdF . It therefore follows from the Lemma above that Equation (6.1)
holds for all F iff h is concave. Direct inspection shows
h′′ = f ′′ρ+∆ ◦ f−1ρ /
(
f ′ρ ◦ f−1ρ
)2− f ′ρ+∆ ◦ f−1ρ · f ′′ρ ◦ f−1ρ /( f ′ρ ◦ f−1ρ )3 ·(6.2)
Therefore h′′ exists and is continuous by inspection. We conclude h is concave iff h′′ ≤ 0.
Equation (6.2) shows h′′ ≤ 0 iff f ′′ρ / f ′ρ ≥ f ′′ρ+∆/ f ′ρ+∆, i.e. ∂∂y ln ∂∂y fρ(y) decreases in ρ . 
We now describe the construction of fR and fL from the empirical income transition
fˆ (y). First define f (y), the upper envelope of fˆ (y) (which is necessarily concave, thereby
inducing POUM dynamics). Now consider the income transition C(y)≡ f (y)−g ·y where
g≡E[ f (y)]/E [y]. C(y) has the same curvature as f (y) since C′′(y) = f ′′(y), yet implies no
change in mean income as E [C(y)] = E
[
f (y)
]−E [g · y] = 0. We conceptualize the “Right
Ideology” fR(y) by adding a multiple of C(y) to the empirical income transition f (y) and
subtracting the same multiple from f (y) to arrive at the “Left Ideology” fL(y). We denote
the constant that multiples C(y) by ρ , giving the following expressions for fR(y) and fL(y):
fR(y)≡ f (y)+ρ
[
f (y)−g · y] , fL(y)≡ f (y)−ρ [ f (y)−g · y] .(6.3)
Increases in the constant ρ generally decrease the demand for redistribution under fR(y), in
line with the intuition that as ρ increases, more of the curvature from f (y) is present in fR.
To illustrate this formally, note that for moderately large ρ , fR(y)≈ f (y)+ρ
[
f (y)−g · y]
so appealing to Proposition 2 we see
∂
∂ρ
∂
∂y
ln
∂
∂y
fR(y)≈ ∂∂ρ
∂
∂y
ln
∂
∂y
(
f (y)+ρ
[
f (y)−g · y])
=
{
f ′′(y)g
}
/
(
f ′(y)+ρ[ f ′(y)−g]
)2
< 0.
Therefore our definition of fR implies lower demand for redistribution as ρ increases; a
higher ρ implies a more powerful POUM effect under fR.20
Figure 5 illustrates the application of this approach of constructing fR(y) and fL(y) in
Chile and Peru. The uppermost curve is fR(y), representing the effect of adding the cur-
vature term ρ ·C(y) to f (y), while the bottom curve is fL(y) with the same term ρ ·C(y)
subtracted from f (y). Referring back to Equation (6.3), the parameter ρ determines the
spectrum of possible income transitions between fR(y) and fL(y) by making both of these
bounding transitions more extreme. Using the empirical income transition functions of
Figure 3, we fix the constant ρ to be the large as possible to capture the widest range
20Alternatively, one may define fR(y)≡ f (y)+ρ
[
f (y)−g · y] to arrive at this result analytically (i.e. without
approximation). This makes no numerical difference in practice, but burdens the subsequent notation.
19
of possibilities, subject to the constraint that both fR(y) and fL(y) are increasing. These
maximal values of ρ are 28.4 (Chile) and 43.2 (Peru).
FIGURE 5. Stylized Right and Left Income Ideologies
(A) Chile (B) Peru
6.2. Learning and Political Dynamics under a ‘TINA’ Prior. The final element needed
to permit analysis of Latin American political dynamics is a specification of voters’ ini-
tial beliefs about income dynamics and the prospects for upward mobility at the begin-
ning of the 1990s. To illustrate the implications of our model, we take seriously the then
common observation that there was an exhaustion of credible political alternatives to a
liberal economic regime. As Margaret Thatcher famously intoned: “TINA–There Is No
Alternative” to free markets (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 1984-85). Thatcher’s state-
ments motivate what we call the TINA or POUM prior, meaning an initial set of beliefs,
pii0(λ ), that heavily weight the right perspective on the income process and its promise
of upward mobility. In the numerical analysis that follows, we use a simple prior form
which places exponential weight on Right beliefs for voters in the initial period, namely
pii0(λ ) = 10e10λ/
(
e10−1). Although this is one particular prior, the results are fairly ro-
bust to any prior highly weighted to the Right ideology.
With the TINA prior in hand, and the empirically grounded representations of Left and
Right ideologies in Figure 5, we are now in a position to numerically simulate political dy-
namics in Chile and Peru. For the simulations, we assume that income process is noisy with
an idiosyncratic income shock parameter σ = 1/2, and that voters look forward ten years
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and have a discount rate of 95%. Figure 6 shows the simulated evolution of political prefer-
ences for Peru in the initial period, six years later and twelve years later. The y-axis shows
the percentage of the electorate preferring redistribution by income percentile. The solid
line in each figure is the full information benchmark, showing what political preferences
would have looked like had voters had perfect information on the true income dynamic.
The dashed line shows political preferences by decile under imperfect information (and
when voters begin with the TINA prior) and when there are no deadweight losses associ-
ated with redistribution. The dotted line shows the same imperfect information scenario
but assumes that redistribution is associated with a 10% deadweight loss.
As can be seen, the preferences of fully and imperfectly informed voters are quite differ-
ent, although absent any deadweight loss the median voter would have preferred redistribu-
tion from the outset. However, with a 10% deadweight loss, the median, forward-looking
voter would have initially voted against redistribution under the TINA prior. However, af-
ter six years of living and learning from the actual income distribution process, the median
voter, and most voters in the lowest seven deciles of the income distribution would have fa-
vored redistributive policies. After a dozen years, the preferences of most voters approach
those that would hold under full information, implying a major political shift from minority
to majority support for redistribution.
FIGURE 6. Demand for a 10 Year Redistributive Policy by Income Percentile
(A) Peru: Year 0 (B) Peru: Year 6 (C) Peru: Year 12
Figure 7 provides another look at the political dynamics implied by our model of forward-
looking, Bayesian voters. The vertical axis now displays the fraction of the electorate at
each point in time that is expected to vote for redistribution. Absent dead weight losses,
over the 1997 to 2009 simulation period in Peru, the fraction voting for redistribution rises
by some 22 percentage points, again approaching the levels that would be expected under
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full information by 2010. With deadweight losses, politics become even more volatile with
a 27% shift over the 12-year simulation period.
These sharp swings in policy preferences are largely driven by swing voters’ reeval-
uation of their prospects for upward mobility as they learn from the actual operation of
the Peruvian economy.21 An interesting contrast to these results is provided by undertak-
ing a similar exercise for the Chilean economy. The estimated Chilean income transition
function of Figure 5(a) is one that shows absolute upward income mobility for all classes,
though not much relative improvement for the initially lower income deciles. While simu-
lated preferences for redistribution in the Chilean case are strong, they remain quite stable
over time, offering a vision of much more stable politics in Chile than in a country with a
polarizing income distribution process.
FIGURE 7. Aggregate Demand for a 10 Year Redistributive Policy
(A) Chile (B) Peru
6.3. Dead Weight Loss and Political Volatility. In the voter simulations just discussed,
deadweight losses increase political volatility, quite substantially in the Peruvian case. At
first glance, this result seems somewhat surprising as one might think that deadweight
losses would uniformly depress the demand for redistribution, but would have no effect
on its volatility. But, as this section explains, this volatility effect is systematic and ex-
plained by the asymmetric effect that D has on a Right partisan with a strong belief in fR
21Recall from Section 4 that under full information, the mere passage of time led to only a tiny change in the
faction of the electorate preferring redistribution.
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in comparison to a Left partisan with a strong belief in fL. Increases in D attrit support for
redistribution much faster for a Right partisan than for a Left partisan, creating a wider gulf
to cross as voters learn. As individuals learn and their beliefs move away from fR, their sen-
sitivity to dead weight losses evaporates, further powering a large shift in the population’s
support for redistributive policies.
In order to formalize this idea, let y˜R denote the income level of a voter who is indifferent
about a single period of redistribution under fR, and similarly let y˜L denote the income
of a voter who is indifferent under fL.22 By definition, the fraction of voters preferring
redistribution under fL is F0 (y˜L) while under fR the fraction is F0 (y˜R). The gap between
these two fractions, F0 (y˜L)−F0 (y˜R), is completely accounted for by the range of possible
beliefs held by voters, and will manifest in voting behavior whenever the beliefs of the
population undergo systematic change. This gap quantifies potential political volatility,
and surprisingly, increases in deadweight loss D increase the magnitude of F0 (y˜L)−F0 (y˜R).
Under plausible assumptions, ∂ [F0 (y˜L)−F0 (y˜R)]/∂D > 0. Direct manipulation show this
inequality is equivalent to Equation (6.4) below, which we will verify step-by-step below
while detailing our assumptions.(
F ′0 (y˜L)/F
′
0 (y˜R)
) · (E [ fL]/E [ fR])< ( f ′L (y˜L)/ f ′R (y˜R))(6.4)
Our first assumption regards the properties of the income distribution. It is a stylized fact
of real world income distributions that the mean is below the median. A similar observation
is that most real world income distributions are unimodal, and that the mode typically oc-
curs within the bottom 25% of the distribution. It follows that voters at or below this unique
mode would always vote for redistribution, even allowing for substantial deadweight loss
of redistribution. These observations are stated as Assumption 2.
Assumption 2. Voters at the unique mode of the income distribution (which, as a stylized
fact, is far below the mean) always prefer redistribution.
Our second assumption is basically that the income transitions fR and fL deserve the
labels of Right and Left, in that fL implies greater demand for redistribution than fR, i.e.
F0 (y˜L) > F0 (y˜R). This assumption may be satisfied in many ways, not least through our
specific construction or more generally by constructing a continuum of Right-Left income
transitions via Proposition 2. We also wish to guarantee that fR is as least no more pes-
simistic about average growth than fL, in than E [ fR] ≥ E [ fL]. With reference to our par-
ticular construction of Right and Left, E [ fR] = E [ fL]. These conditions are summarized as
Assumption 3.
22From the development above, these incomes are y˜R = f−1R ((1−D)E [ fR]) and y˜L = f−1L ((1−D)E [ fL]).
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Assumption 3. Right and Left income transitions have been constructed so that Left voters
prefer more redistribution that Right voters. In addition, average growth under the Right
transition is at least as high as under the Left transition.
So far, these two assumptions guarantee the left hand side of Equation (6.4) is less than
one. Assumption 3 directly implies E [ fL]/E [ fR] ≤ 1, and also that y˜L > y˜R. Since the
income distribution is unimodal, the density of the distribution F ′0 is decreasing for all in-
comes above the mode. Since by Assumption 2 the incomes y˜L and y˜R are above the mode,
it follows that F ′0 (y˜L)/F
′
0 (y˜R) < 1. Putting these together, we see Equation (6.4) holds so
long as 1 ≤ f ′L (y˜L)/ f ′R (y˜R). As we will illustrate below, this condition can be made intu-
itive through a graphical analysis, and is in fact is a natural consequence of modeling Right
and Left transitions in terms of their curvature. We therefore state our third assumption as
1≤ f ′L (y˜L)/ f ′R (y˜R), stated in words as
Assumption 4. At the incomes that Right and Left voters are (respectively) indifferent
about redistribution, Left income is increasing faster than Right income.
In order to explain Assumption 4, we depict idealized transitions fR and fL in Figure
8. This figure supposes fR is concave while fL is convex, which is approximately true
when fR and fL are constructed as described above. Fix any future mean income µ above
median income, and consider the level of support for redistribution next period as dead
weight loss D increases, depicted as a shift in the horizontal line µ to (1−D)µ in Figure
8. As dead weight loss increases, the fraction of the population supporting redistribution
decreases under both fR and fL. Under fR, this decrease is from F0( f−1R (µ)) to F0( f
−1
R ([1−
D]µ)) which in Figure 8 is larger than the drop in support under fL, from F0( f−1L (µ))
to F0( f−1L ([1−D]µ)). This asymmetric effect of dead weight loss holds because in the
illustrated range, the concavity of fR implies fR is much flatter than fL, which is convex.
A local characterization that fR is flatter than fL is f ′R (y˜R) ≤ f ′L (y˜L), which is precisely
Assumption 4 and ensures that Equation (6.4) holds. We therefore have Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 2-4, higher levels of deadweight loss further polarize
support for redistribution between Right and Left voters.
Proposition 3 summarizes that when ideologies are modeled as income dynamics, Right
voters intrinsically have more aversion to dead weight loss than Left voters. Dead weight
loss further polarizes support for redistribution between Right and Left, and when voters
update their beliefs away from extreme priors, the effect will be to increase volatility.
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FIGURE 8. Polarization from Dead weight Loss
7. CONCLUSION
Adopting the perspective that voters are forward-looking and pay attention to income
dynamics, not just to their place in the contemporaneous income distribution, this paper
has explored the left-right-left shift in the politics of Latin American countries over the
last three or four decades. Two analytical innovations are key to this exploration. The
first is a generalization of earlier work on forward-looking voters. We here model political
preferences under general families of income distribution dynamics, not just under con-
cave dynamics that offer prospects of upward mobility. This generalization, motivated by
empirical evidence of polarizing, non-concave dynamics that offer no prospects of upward
mobility for segments of the population, shows that preferences for redistributive policies
may increase, not decrease over time when voters are forward-looking. The key message
is that unlike a world which offers upward mobility to low income voters, the dynamics
of demand for redistribution are not a foregone conclusion and may manifest in volatile
political patterns. This points to evaluating the relationship between income dynamics and
political choices in light of the conditions voters face on a country-specific basis.
However, detailed analysis of the case of Peru suggests that there would have been ini-
tially strong support for redistribution had voters been fully informed about the nature of
the income distribution dynamics, making it extremely hard to account for the elections
in Peru and elsewhere in Latin America in the 1990s that brought conservative candidates
to power. This observation motivates this paper’s second innovation, namely its model-
ing of voters as Bayesian learners who update their understanding of income distribution
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dynamics based on their own lived experience. Given that most voters in Peru (and other
countries which saw a transition to a market economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s)
had little prior experience with the new economic model, we assume that they initially
adopted a prior probability distribution that put substantial weight on an ideological po-
sition that attached strong prospects for upward mobility to the region’s new economic
model. Numerical simulation of political preferences as voters received noisy draws from
the true (calibrated) income distribution process shows that a substantial shift from strong
right political majority to a strong left political majority over the course of about a dozen
years. Somewhat surprisingly, political volatility is actually increased when the electorate
believes that redistributive policies carry dead weight losses. We show that this volatility
of deadweight loss is to be expected under fairly weak assumptions.
Latin America of the 1990s is not only the region to have transitioned to a market econ-
omy. While there can certainly be no claim that the precise voting dynamics derived here
for Peru apply to other countries, the information deficit and voting dilemma confronted by
the Peruvian electorate has had its reflection in a much larger number of countries that have
transitioned to political democracy and market economies. Modeling the evolving political
preferences of voters in these regions as forward-looking, Bayesian learners offers insights
into the complex and often unstable voting patterns observed in these other regions.
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APPENDIX A. RECOVERY OF SIMPLE INCOME DYNAMICS
As developed above, we fit a class of income transitions fβ (y) defined by piecewise
line segments spanning each income decile. Specifically, these line segments span the
midpoints between each income decile (with endpoints defined by incomes at zero and
twice the tenth income decile). The years used to determine the midpoints are roughly in
the middle of our data sample years: 2001 in Chile and 1998 in Peru. The values of β
which maximize Equation (4.2) for each country are reported in Table 1. The parameter
values of ρ and g which determine Right and Left income transitions are ρChile = 29.939,
ρPeru = 57.708 and gChile = 1.021, gPeru = 1.009.
TABLE 1. Income Transition Parameters
Slope of Income Transition in each Decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Chile 1.035 1.025 1.028 1.024 1.022 1.023 1.020 1.021 1.024 1.025
Peru 1.032 0.979 1.004 0.998 0.976 1.014 1.000 0.980 1.031 1.023
APPENDIX B. DEPENDENCE OF REDISTRIBUTIVE DEMAND ON INITIAL INCOME
B.1. Example: Fragility of Redistributive Dynamics. Consider an income distribution
F0 composed of three equally sized groups with incomes Y1,Y2,Y3 where 0 < Y1 < Y2 <
Y3 < Y . Then µt = ∑(1/3) · f (t)(Yi) and so clearly depends on the initial distribution of
income F0 interacting with the evolution of group incomes f (t)(Yi). Now also suppose f
has three fixed points YTrap < YEscape < Y where for y < YEscape, f
(t)(y)−→ YTrap and
for y > YEscape, f
(t)(y) −→ Y . In this case all groups are going to either YTrap or Y . To
fix ideas, assume Y1 <YEscape <Y3 so the Y1 group converges to YTrap while Y3 converges
to Y . Clearly Y1 prefers the complete redistribution scheme r1 while Y3 prefers r0. This
leaves open the middle class of “swing voters” Y2. If Y2 > YEscape then the middle class
eventually climbs the income ladder to Y and joins the (now majoritarian) voting block of
Y3. Otherwise, if Y2 < YEscape there is a thinning of the middle class and swing voters
eventually join with Y1, implying the median voter prefers redistribution. Note the fragility
of the eventual voting outcomes: a small income difference δ in Y2 can push Y2 + δ to be
greater or less than YEscape. This eventually results in a large fraction p2 of swing voters to
switch their vote as income evolves. Similar consequences can arise if voters lack perfect
information about F0 or f so that small changes in beliefs can give rise to large changes in
redistributive preferences.
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B.2. Example: The Same Income Transition Often Can Imply Both Increase and De-
creasing Redistributive Demand. This proposition shows that a broad class of dynamics
can exhibit either increasing or decreasing demand for redistribution. The deciding factor
for redistributive dynamics, even for a fixed dynamic, is the initial distribution of income.
This emphasizes the interrelationship between “Upward/No Mobility” in the dynamic role
of income transitions and the “existing order” in the role of the income distribution: politi-
cal implications cannot be drawn without considering both.
Proposition. Suppose f is bounded and define f (∞)(y)≡ limt−→∞ f (t)(y) as an individual’s
income after an arbitrarily long period of time. Let µ∞ be the least possible per capita
income under f (∞) and let µ∞ be the highest possible per capita income under f (∞).
(1) (POUM Forever) If
[
µ∞,µ∞
]
intersects the interior of YPOUM, there is an initial
distribution of income where the demand for redistribution always decreases.
(2) (No-POUM Forever) If
[
µ∞,µ∞
]
intersects the interior of YNoPOUM there is an
initial distribution of income where the demand for redistribution always increases.
Proof. Formally, we have µ∞ ≡ infF0
∫
f (∞)dF0 and µ∞ ≡ supF0
∫
f (∞)dF0 where the infin-
imum and supremum are taken over bounded, absolutely continuous initial income distri-
butions. µ∞ and µ∞ are both in [0,∞) as for any fixed F0, f is bounded so
∫
f (∞)dF0 =
limt−→∞
∫
f (t)dF0 by bounded convergence, and clearly each
∫
f (t)dF0 ∈ [0,sup f ].
We will consider the POUM case as the other case is similar. By hypothesis, there is
some µ∗ ∈
[
µ∞,µ∞
]
and an open set V such that µ∗ ∈ V ⊂ YPOUM. Fix ε > 0 such that
µ∗± ε ∈ V and fix λ such that µ∗ = λµ∞+(1−λ )µ∞ (note this forces λ ∈ [0,1]). Now
define, for any initial income distribution G, µGt ≡
∫
f (t)dG. By definition of µ∞ and µ∞
we may choose initial income distributions F and F where
lim
t−→∞µ
F
t < µ∞+ ε/2 and limt−→∞µ
F
t > µ∞− ε/2.
It follows that there is a T such that for all t ≥ T , µFt < µ∞ + ε and µFt > µ∞ − ε .
This implies
∣∣∣λµFt +(1−λ )µFt −[λµ∞+(1−λ )µ∞]∣∣∣ < ε for all t ≥ T . Since λµ∞+
(1−λ )µ∞ = µ∗ and F˜ ≡ λF +(1−λ )F is an admissible initial income distribution, we
see
∣∣∣µ F˜t −µ∗∣∣∣ < ε for all t ≥ T . By construction, this implies µ F˜t ∈ V ⊂ YPOUM, so by
Proposition 1, the demand for redistribution is always decreasing when the initial distribu-
tion of income is F0(y)≡ F˜( f (T )(y)). 
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APPENDIX C. DEMAND FOR REDISTRIBUTION UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION
In general, neither fL nor fR need reflect reality but rather idealized versions of what
Left and Right ideologues might represent in a manifesto. Clearly the relative strength of a
voter’s beliefs in these world views will influence voting behavior. In order to emphasize
the role of beliefs piit(λ |Hit) in deriving a voter’s expected income, we now illustrate the
decisions of a pocketbook voter who is also a Bayesian learner.
If a voter knows the true value of λ , namely λ0, then beliefs pii0(λ ) put a point mass of 1
on λ0. This is the perfect information case, and as above expected income in period 1 would
be given by E[yi1|Hi0,pii0] = fλ0(yi0). However, each voter does not know λ0 with certainty
but has a non-degenerate prior density pii0(λ ) over possible values of λ . Now consider a
voter in period 0 with income yi0. The voter’s expected income in period 1 is a weighted
average of expected income over plausible values of λ , namely E[yi1|Hi0,λ = λ0] = fλ (yi0)
weighted by pii0(λ ). Specifically,
E[yi1|Hi0,pii0] =
∫ 1
0
E[yi1|Hi0,λ ]pii0(λ )dλ =
∫ 1
0
fλ (yi0)pii0(λ )dλ
More generally, at the end of periods 1 to t, a voter updates his prior pii0(λ ) to a posterior
piit(λ ) using his new history Hit = {yi0, . . .yit}. Therefore expected income in period t +1
is given by
(C.1) E[yit+1|Hit ,pii0] =
∫
f (t+1)λ (yi0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Income|λ
· piit(λ |Hit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
History Dependent Beliefs Over λ
dλ
Equation (C.1) highlights the two dynamic factors which influence a voter’s beliefs about
expected income. The first element, expected income given λ is the true state of the world,
is deterministic as under perfect information. The second element, a voter’s ideological
beliefs, evolve as information is collected in the form of the idiosyncratic income history
Hit .
Since each possible value of λ corresponds to an economy wide income dynamic, a
voter’s beliefs also impact expectations about mean income next period. Specifically, mean
income in period t +1 given fλ is the true income dynamic is µt+1|λ ≡
∫
f (t+1)λ (y)dF(y).
Thus, a voter with an income history Hit and prior pii0 believes mean income in period t+1
is given by
E[µt+1|Hit ,pii0] =
∫ 1
0
[µt+1|λ ] ·piit(λ |Hit)dλ
=
∫ 1
0
[∫
f (t+1)λ (y)dF(y)
]
piit(λ |Hit)dλ(C.2)
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After accounting for any dead weight loss D, a voter will prefer redistribution if and only
if E[(1−D)µt+1|Hit ,pii0] ≥ E[yit+1|Hit ,pii0]. From Equations (C.1) and (C.2) this means
voters prefer redistribution when∫ 1
0
[
(1−D)
∫
f (t+1)λ (y)dF(y)− f
(t+1)
λ (yi0)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Transfer|λ
·piit(λ |Hit)dλ ≥ 0(C.3)
Equation (C.3) shows that a voter prefers redistribution when, given their history Hit , they
believe the expected transfer from redistribution will be positive. Note that two voters with
the same initial incomes need not have the same redistributive preferences: whether Equa-
tion (C.3) holds depends on each voter’s income history through their beliefs piit(λ |Hit).
This implies the popularity of redistributive policies varies in a nontrivial way across initial
incomes. Preferred policies for each voter, conditional on their history Hit , are summarized
in Equation (C.4).
Period
t+1
Policy
=
Redistribute,
∫ [
(1−D)µt+1|λ − f (t+1)λ (yi0)
]
piit(λ |Hit)dλ ≥ 0
Laissez Faire,
∫ [
(1−D)µt+1|λ − f (t+1)λ (yi0)
]
piit(λ |Hit)dλ ≤ 0
(C.4)
Equation (C.4) allows us to make a clear connection from ideological beliefs to demand for
redistribution through the following assumption:
Assumption. Increases in λ imply expected income improves relative to transfers ( ddλ f
(t)
λ (yi0)≥
d
dλ (1−D)µt |λ ) for all swing voters defined as yi0 where
yi0 ∈
[
f (−t)R ((1−D)µt |λ = 1) , f (−t)L ((1−D)µt |λ = 0)
]
(Swing Voters)
This Assumption says that as λ increases (moves to the Right), each voter believes his ex-
pected income f (t)λ (yi0) increases relatively more than expected transfers (1−D)µt |λ . Fur-
thermore, we only require this to hold for voters who might potentially change their vote:
the votes of both destitute ( f (t)λ (yi0) < (1−D)µt |λ for all λ ) and well-to-do ( f
(t)
λ (yi0) >
(1−D)µt |λ for all λ ) are unaffected by belief.
Assumption C implies the expected transfer (1−D)µt |λ − f (t)λ (yi0) is decreasing in λ .
It follows that voter j tends to prefer less redistribution than voter i when voter j’s beliefs
pi jt are “to the Right” of a voter i’s beliefs piit . To make this precise, assume that pi j stochas-
tically dominates pii and i and j have the same initial incomes. Since for each fixed λ ,
(1−D)µt |λ − f (t)λ (yi0) = (1−D)µt |λ − f
(t)
λ (y j0) and this equation is decreasing in λ , the
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dominance of pi j over pii implies∫ [
(1−D)µt |λ − f (t)λ (y j0)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Transfer|λ
pi jt(λ )dλ ≤
∫ [
(1−D)µt |λ − f (t)λ (yi0)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Transfer|λ
piit(λ )dλ(C.5)
Equation (C.5) shows that the “Right” voter j believes they will receive a lower net transfer
from redistribution than the “Left” voter i. Therefore voter j tends to prefers less redistri-
bution than voter i. This result which connects ideological belief to redistributive demand
is summarized as Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Suppose the Assumption above holds. If voters i and j are identical ex-
cept voter j’s beliefs pi jt stochastically dominate voter i’s beliefs piit , then j prefers less
redistribution than i.
Proposition 4 shows that the further to the ideological Right a voter is, the less redistri-
bution they prefer. In this framework, one would expect that the speed of learning would
be related to both the variability of income signals and the gap between left and right pre-
dictions for an individual’s future income position. These expectations imply a rich set of
testable implications about the evolution of political preferences and voting that we hope
to explore in future work.
APPENDIX D. PROOFS
Lemma. Suppose f and g are continuous where g is defined on f ((−∞,∞)). Then g is
concave iff g(E [ f (X)])≥ E [g( f (X))] for all bounded random variables X.
Proof. Fix a,b∈ f−1((−∞,∞)) , λ ∈ [0,1] and some a˜, b˜ where a˜∈ f−1(a) and b˜∈ f−1(b).
For each δ > 0 define a distribution
Hδ (x)≡
∫ x
−∞
[
(λ/2δ ) ·1[a˜−δ ,a˜+δ ](t)+((1−λ )/2δ ) ·1[b˜−δ ,b˜+δ ](t)
]
dt
where 1A(t) denotes the indicator for t contained in the set A. Clearly each Hδ is the
distribution of a bounded random variable. We will show that
g(λa+(1−λ )b) = lim
δ→0
g
(∫
f dHδ
)
≥ lim
δ→0
∫
g◦ f dHδ = λg(a)+(1−λ )g(b)(D.1)
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By assumption, g(
∫
f dHδ )≥
∫
g◦ f dHδ for each δ , so all that remains to show are the
values of each limit in Equation (D.1). First, we evaluate limδ→0 g(
∫
f dHδ ) and consider∣∣∣∣∫ f (t) λ2δ 1[a˜−δ ,a˜+δ ](t)dt−λa
∣∣∣∣= λ2δ
∣∣∣∣∫ δ−δ f ( f−1(a)+ t)− f ( f−1(a))dt
∣∣∣∣
≤ λ
2δ
·2δ · sup
|t|≤δ
∣∣ f ( f−1(a)+ t)− f ( f−1(a))∣∣−→ 0(D.2)
as δ −→ 0 because f is continuous at f−1(a). Similarly, as δ −→ 0,∣∣∣∣∫ f (t)(1−λ )2δ 1[b˜−δ ,b˜+δ ](t)dt− (1−λ )b
∣∣∣∣−→ 0(D.3)
and putting Equations (D.2) and (D.3) together we conclude that limδ→0
∫
f dHδ −→ λa+
(1−λ )b. Continuity of g then implies that limδ→0 g(
∫
f dHδ ) = g(λa+(1−λ )b).
Finally, since g is continuous, the argument above can be repeated taking g ◦ f in place
of f , which shows limδ→0
∫
g ◦ f dHδ = λg(a) + (1−λ )g(b). Therefore we conclude
Equation (D.1) holds, so g is concave. 
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